areas), including a summary of the conclusions reached under each **such** study.

SEC. 1CMJ3. SENSE OF CONGBESS ON STAMT TALES

Congress hereby reaffirms the sense of Congress expressed in the second session of the 100th Congress (in section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2031)) that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva or otherwise)—

(1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force; and

(2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nuclear cruise missiles.

SEC. 1004. EEFORT ON ASYMMETRIES IN CAPABILITIES OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION TO PRODUCE AND DEPLOY BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS

(3) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study on the asymmetry in the near-term capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy ballistic missile defenses beyond those permitted under the 1972 ABM Treaty. The study shall be conducted in coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence.

(4) MATTEBS To BE INCLUDED IN STUDY.—Subject to subsection (e), the study shall include the following:

(5) An assessment of the likelihood of a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty in the next five years and the assumptions used for that assessment.

(6) An assessment of the capability of the Soviet Union to exploit a situation in which the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty do not apply, including a detailed assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Union to produce—

(7) space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) launchers and interceptors;

(8) ground-based ABM launchers and interceptors; and

(9) the infrastructure for ABM battle management command, control, and communications.

(3) An assessment of the production base of the United States for production of the elements specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (O of paragraph (2), including an estimate of how quickly the United States could respond to a breakout by the Soviet Union in each of those elements.

(c) STUDY To ASSESS POSSIBLE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO SOVIET BKEAKOUT.—(1) The study shall also include an assessment of the immediate and long-term actions that could be taken by the United States to respond to redress any asymmetry in the potential of the

United States and the Soviet Union to exploit a breakout by the Soviet Union from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

(2) That assessment shall include an evaluation of the actions that would be necessary to support—

(10) a one-site ABM system (as allowed under the Treaty); or

(11) an expanded ABM system unconstrained by the limitations of the 1972 ABM Treaty.